Functions/BloxOne/BloxOneTD/Get-B1ThreatIntel.ps1
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function Get-B1ThreatIntel { <# .SYNOPSIS Queries Threat Intel analysis, alerts, advisories & other reports from Infoblox Threat Intel .DESCRIPTION This function will query Threat Intel analysis, alerts, advisories & other reports from Infoblox Threat Intel. A full list of Threat Actor IOCs can be retrieved through using Get-B1ThreatActor .PARAMETER ThreatActors The -ThreatActors switch will return a list of threat actors detected within your environment. .PARAMETER Start The -Start parameter allows you to define the Start date of which to begin searching. This is only applicable when using -ThreatActors. Defaults to 30 days ago. .PARAMETER End The -End parameter allows you to define the End date of which to search. This is only applicable when using -ThreatActors. Defaults to now. .PARAMETER Limit Use -Limit to limit the number of results returned. This is only applicable when using -ThreatActors. Defaults to 15. Using a large limit here may result in long waiting times. .PARAMETER Publications The -Publications switch will return a list of threat intelligence publications from Infoblox. .PARAMETER Search The -Search parameter allows you to filter the results of threat intelligence publications using search terms. .PARAMETER ZeroDayDNS The -ZeroDayDNS switch will return a list Zero Day DNS domains associated with your account. .PARAMETER Unique Return only unique results when using -ZeroDayDNS .EXAMPLE PS> Get-B1ThreatIntel -ZeroDayDNS | Select sld -Unique sld --- inmedia.agency mwuff9s29e.com x92-cc6vty.cc .EXAMPLE PS> Get-B1ThreatIntel -ThreatActors -Start (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) actor_id : 8bbe1293-9be7-4533-bc09-13ff1661e0ba actor_name : 3CX compromise actor_description : These indicators are associated with the compromise of a legitimate software application 3CX, published by CISA, CrowdStrike, and SentinelOne on or around 30 March 2023. The malicious activity includes beaconing to actor-controlled infrastructure, deployment of second-stage payloads, and, in a small number of cases, hands-on-keyboard activity according to research by CrowdStrike and SentinelOne. See CISA alert for more details : (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/03/30/supply-chain-attack-against-3cxdesktopapp). purpose : {malware} ttp : {dns_c2, exfiltration} display_name : 3CX compromise customer_first_dns_query : 3/16/2023 12:00:00 AM customer_last_dns_query : 6/5/2024 12:00:00 AM ikb_first_submitted : 12/12/2022 6:25:48 PM ikb_last_submitted : 3/30/2023 5:19:43 PM ikb_first_classified_malicious : 3/23/2023 5:34:05 PM related_count : 21 page : 1 related_indicators_with_dates : {@{indicator=pbxphonenetwork.com; vt_first_submission_date=3/29/2023 8:24:31 AM; te_ik_submitted=12/27/2022 6:21:34 PM}, @{indicator=msedgepackageinfo.com; vt_first_submission_date=3/29/2023 11:53:17 AM; te_ik_submitted=1/7/2023 6:23:41 PM}, @{indicator=glcloudservice.com; vt_first_submission_date=3/29/2023 2:26:35 PM; te_ik_submitted=3/20/2023 5:36:17 PM}, @{indicator=azureonlinestorage.com; vt_first_submission_date=1/18/2023 2:01:59 AM; te_ik_submitted=1/6/2023 3:06:06 PM}} actor_id : cd186f03-b572-42dd-98c7-202ec25ede93 actor_name : Venal Viper actor_description : Threat actor operates a malicious HTTP-based traffic distribution system (TDS). Infoblox has tracked actor since 2022 and assess the malicious activity is from advertising company Adsterra. This actor is observed to affiliate with other TDS operators including VexTrio. infoblox_references : {https://blogs.infoblox.com/threat-intelligence/cybercrime-central-vextrio-operates-massive-criminal-affiliate-program/} external_references : {https://www.blackhatworld.com/seo/warnning-dont-use-adsterra-malware-infected-network.1315557/, https://adsterra.com/blog/official-statement-no-tolerance-for-illegal-traffic-sources/, https://thegrayhatguy.com/ad-programs/adsterra-review/, https://www.qurium.org/alerts/adsterra-used-to-promote-malicious-content-using-hacked-facebook-pages/…} purpose : {malware, pup, scam, phishing…} ttp : {tds, rdga} display_name : Venal Viper customer_first_dns_query : 7/1/2021 12:00:00 AM customer_last_dns_query : 6/5/2024 12:00:00 AM ikb_first_submitted : 12/17/2022 3:06:56 PM ikb_last_submitted : 5/27/2024 2:20:25 PM ikb_first_classified_malicious : 2/16/2023 2:11:58 PM related_count : 14441 page : 1 related_indicators_with_dates : {@{indicator=alienateclergy.com; vt_first_submission_date=2/16/2024 9:49:12 PM; te_ik_submitted=2/16/2024 2:17:53 PM}, @{indicator=amplitudereportmoscow.com; vt_first_submission_date=4/12/2024 2:36:19 AM; te_ik_submitted=3/27/2024 2:24:30 PM}, @{indicator=angrilyunbuttoncouch.com; te_ik_submitted=4/15/2024 2:19:16 PM}, @{indicator=antetestingstooped.com; vt_first_submission_date=5/27/2023 9:24:25 AM; te_ik_submitted=5/13/2023 2:11:43 PM}…} .EXAMPLE PS> Get-B1ThreatIntel -Publications -Search 'Meerkat' id : 30de94e1-c20b-41d9-bc42-6908f1b5bfff document_id : BLG-2024-11 title : Muddling Meerkat: The Great Firewall Manipulator overview : Muddling Meerkat appears to be a People's Republic of China (PRC) nation state actor. It conducts active operations through DNS by creating large volumes of widely distributed queries that are subsequently propagated through the internet using open DNS resolvers. Their operations intertwine with two topics tightly connected with China and Chinese actors: the Chinese Great Firewall (GFW) and Slow Drip, or random prefix, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. While Muddling Meerkat's operations look at first glance like DNS DDoS attacks, it seems unlikely that denial of service is their goal, at least in the near term. Muddling Meerkat operations are long-running - apparently starting in October 2019 - and demonstrate a high degree of expertise in DNS. publish_date : 4/29/2024 10:31:34 PM id : 2cdc636d-861f-45d8-9783-2c5bfe60c6ba document_id : BLG-2024-13 title : What a Show! An Amplified Internet Scale DNS Probing Operation overview : A global scale domain name system (DNS) probing operation that targets open resolvers has been underway since at least June 2023. We analyzed queries to Infoblox and many other recursive DNS resolvers in January 2024. While there are numerous commercial and academic DNS measurement operations conducted daily on the internet, this one stood out because of its size and the invasive structure of the queries. These probes utilize name servers in the China Education and Research Network (CERNET) to identify open DNS resolvers and measure how they react to different responses. The name servers return random IP addresses for a large percentage of queries. The random IP values trigger an amplification of queries by the Palo Alto Cortex Xpanse product. This amplification pollutes passive DNS collections across the globe and hinders the ability to perform reliable research on malicious actors. publish_date : 6/3/2024 11:13:02 PM .FUNCTIONALITY BloxOneDDI .FUNCTIONALITY BloxOne Threat Defense #> [CmdletBinding()] param( [Parameter(ParameterSetName='ThreatActors')] [Switch]$ThreatActors, [Parameter(ParameterSetName='ThreatActors')] [datetime]$Start = (Get-Date).AddMonths(-1), [Parameter(ParameterSetName='ThreatActors')] [datetime]$End = (Get-Date), [Parameter(ParameterSetName='ThreatActors')] [Int]$Limit = 15, [Parameter(ParameterSetName='Publications')] [Switch]$Publications, [Parameter(ParameterSetName='Publications')] [String]$Search, [Parameter(ParameterSetName='ZeroDayDNS')] [Switch]$ZeroDayDNS, [Parameter(ParameterSetName='ZeroDayDNS')] [Switch]$Unique ) if ($ThreatActors) { $Filters = @( @{ "and" = @( @{ "member" = "PortunusAggIPSummary.threat_indicator" "operator" = "set" } @{ "member" = "PortunusAggIPSummary.actor_id" "operator" = "set" } ) } ) $Results = Invoke-B1CubeJS -Cube PortunusAggIPSummary -Measures count -Dimensions threat_indicator,actor_id -TimeDimension timestamp -Start $Start -End $End -Limit $Limit -Grouped -Filters $Filters -OrderBy timestampMax -Order 'desc' $ThreatActorData = @() $UniqueResults = $Results | Select-Object 'actor_id' -Unique $IndicatorPayload = @{ 'actor_indicators' = @() } ForEach ($UniqueResult in $UniqueResults) { $SimilarResults = $Results | Where-Object {$UniqueResult.'actor_id' -eq $_.'actor_id'} $IndicatorPayload.actor_indicators += @{ "indicators" = @($SimilarResults.'threat_indicator') "actor_id" = $UniqueResult.'actor_id' } } $IndicatorJSONPayload = $IndicatorPayload | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 5 $ThreatActorData += Invoke-CSP -Method POST -Uri "$(Get-B1CSPUrl)/tide-ng-threat-actor/v1/batch_actor_summary_with_indicators" -Data $IndicatorJSONPayload return $ThreatActorData | Select-Object -ExpandProperty actor_responses } if ($Publications) { $Results = Invoke-CSP -Method GET -Uri "$(Get-B1CSPUrl)/tide/cyberint-reports/v1/list_reports?text_search=$($Search)" return $Results | Select-Object -ExpandProperty reports -EA SilentlyContinue -WA SilentlyContinue } if ($ZeroDayDNS) { $Results = Invoke-CSP -Method GET -Uri "$(Get-B1CSPUrl)/tide-ng-threat-actor/v1/zero_day_domains" if ($Unique) { return $Results | Select-Object -ExpandProperty detections -EA SilentlyContinue -WA SilentlyContinue | Select-Object sld,detection_type,detection_family -Unique } else { return $Results | Select-Object -ExpandProperty detections -EA SilentlyContinue -WA SilentlyContinue } } } |