PersistenceSniper.psm1
<#PSScriptInfo .VERSION 1.7.0 .GUID e870ebd8-e4d0-4de3-aea6-58a85d7b3200 .AUTHOR Federico @last0x00 Lagrasta .DESCRIPTION This module tries to enumerate all the persistence methods implanted on a compromised machine. New techniques may take some time before they are implemented in this script, so don't assume that because the script didn't find anything the machine is clean. .COMPANYNAME @APTortellini .COPYRIGHT CC0 1.0 Universal .TAGS Windows Persistence Detection Blue Team .LICENSEURI https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ .PROJECTURI https://github.com/last-byte/PersistenceSniper .ICONURI https://github.com/last-byte/PersistenceSniper/blob/main/resources/persistencesniper2.png .EXTERNALMODULEDEPENDENCIES .REQUIREDSCRIPTS .EXTERNALSCRIPTDEPENDENCIES .RELEASENOTES This release contains a number of improvements as well as new persistence techniques. The output also contains member properties detailing if the binaries used are builtin binaries and/or LOLbins. .PRIVATEDATA #> #Requires -RunAsAdministrator function Find-AllPersistence { <# .SYNOPSIS Find-AllPersistence is PersistenceSniper's main function. All the other functions defined in it are used by Find-AllPersistence to gather information on potential persistence techniques implanted on the machines PersistenceSniper is run on. .DESCRIPTION Enumerate all the persistence methods found on a machine and print them for the user to see. .PARAMETER PersistenceMethod Optional, choose a single persistence method to check for. Default value is All. .PARAMETER ComputerName Optional, an array of computernames to run the script on. .PARAMETER DiffCSV Optional, a CSV file to be taken as input and used to exclude from the output all the local persistences which match the ones in the CSV file itself. .PARAMETER IncludeHighFalsePositivesChecks Optional, a switch which forces PersistenceSniper to also call a number of functions with checks which are more difficult to filter and in turn cause a lot of false positives. .PARAMETER OutputCSV Optional, a CSV file to be used as output which will contain all the findings in a CSV format. .EXAMPLE Find-AllPersistence Enumerate low false positive persistence techniques implanted on the local machine. .EXAMPLE Find-AllPersistence -PersistenceMethod RunAndRunOnce Enumerate only persistence techniques implanted on the local machine relying on the Run and RunOnce registry keys. .EXAMPLE $Persistences = Find-AllPersistence Enumerate low false positive persistence techniques implanted on the local machine and save them in Powershell variable for later processing. .EXAMPLE Find-AllPersistence -OutputCSV .\persistences.csv Enumerate low false positive persistence techniques implanted on the local machine and output to a CSV. .EXAMPLE Find-AllPersistence -DiffCSV .\persistences.csv Enumerate low false positive persistence techniques implanted on the local machine but show us only the persistences which are not in an input CSV. .EXAMPLE Find-AllPersistence -DiffCSV .\persistences.csv Enumerate low false positive persistence techniques implanted on the local machine but show us only the persistences which are not in an input CSV and output the results on another CSV. .EXAMPLE Find-AllPersistence -ComputerName @('dc1.macrohard.lol', 'dc2.macrohard.lol') -IncludeHighFalsePositivesChecks -DiffCSV .\persistences.csv -OutputCSV .\findings.csv Enumerate all persistence techniques implanted on an array of remote machines but show only the persistences which are not in an input CSV and output the findings on a CSV. .EXAMPLE Find-AllPersistence -ComputerName (Get-Content computers.txt) -IncludeHighFalsePositivesChecks -DiffCSV .\persistences.csv -OutputCSV .\findings.csv Enumerate all persistence techniques implanted on an array of remote machines retrieved from a file containing one hostname per line but show only the persistences which are not in an input CSV and output the findings on a CSV. .EXAMPLE Find-AllPersistence -DiffCSV .\persistences.csv -OutputCSV .\findings.csv | Where-Object Classification -Like "MITRE ATT&CK T*" Enumerate all persistence techniques implanted on the local machine, filter out the ones in the persistences.csv file, save the results in findings.csv and output to console only the persistences which are classified under the MITRE ATT&CK framework. #> Param( [Parameter(Position = 0)] [ValidateSet( 'All', 'RunAndRunOnce', 'ImageFileExecutionOptions', 'NLDPDllOverridePath', 'AeDebug', 'WerFaultHangs', 'CmdAutoRun', 'ExplorerLoad', 'WinlogonUserinit', 'WinlogonShell', 'TerminalProfileStartOnUserLogin', 'AppCertDlls', 'ServiceDlls', 'GPExtensionDlls', 'WinlogonMPNotify', 'CHMHelperDll', 'HHCtrlHijacking', 'StartupPrograms', 'UserInitMprScript', 'AutodialDLL', 'LsaExtensions', 'ServerLevelPluginDll', 'LsaPasswordFilter', 'LsaAuthenticationPackages', 'LsaSecurityPackages', 'WinlogonNotificationPackages', 'ExplorerTools', 'DotNetDebugger', 'ErrorHandlerCmd', 'WMIEventsSubscrition', 'WindowsServices', 'AppPaths', 'TerminalServicesInitialProgram', 'AccessibilityTools' )] $PersistenceMethod = 'All', [Parameter(Position = 1)] [String[]] $ComputerName = $null, [Parameter(Position = 2)] [String] $DiffCSV = $null, [Parameter(Position = 3)] [Switch] $IncludeHighFalsePositivesChecks, [Parameter(Position = 4)] [String] $OutputCSV = $null ) $ScriptBlock = { $ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue' $VerbosePreference = $Using:VerbosePreference $hostname = ([Net.Dns]::GetHostByName($env:computerName)).HostName $script:psProperties = @('PSChildName', 'PSDrive', 'PSParentPath', 'PSPath', 'PSProvider') $script:persistenceObjectArray = [Collections.ArrayList]::new() $script:systemAndUsersHives = [Collections.ArrayList]::new() $systemHive = (Get-Item Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE).PSpath $null = $systemAndUsersHives.Add($systemHive) $sids = Get-ChildItem Registry::HKEY_USERS foreach($sid in $sids) { $null = $systemAndUsersHives.Add($sid.PSpath) } function New-PersistenceObject { param( [String] $Hostname = $null, [String] $Technique = $null, [String] $Classification = $null, [String] $Path = $null, [String] $Value = $null, [String] $AccessGained = $null, [String] $Note = $null, [String] $Reference = $null, [String] $Signature = $null , [Bool] $IsBuiltinBinary = $false, [Bool] $IsLolbin = $false ) $PersistenceObject = [PSCustomObject]@{ 'Hostname' = $Hostname 'Technique' = $Technique 'Classification' = $Classification 'Path' = $Path 'Value' = $Value 'Access Gained' = $AccessGained 'Note' = $Note 'Reference' = $Reference 'Signature' = Find-CertificateInfo (Get-ExecutableFromCommandLine $Value) 'IsBuiltinBinary' = Get-IfBuiltinBinary (Get-ExecutableFromCommandLine $Value) 'IsLolbin' = Get-IfLolBin (Get-ExecutableFromCommandLine $Value) } return $PersistenceObject } function Get-IfLolBin { param( [String] $executable ) # To get an updated list of lolbins # curl https://lolbas-project.github.io/# | grep -E "bin-name\">(.*)\.exe<" -o | cut -d ">" -f 2 | cut -d "<" -f 1 [String[]]$lolbins = "APPINSTALLER.EXE", "ASPNET_COMPILER.EXE", "AT.EXE", "ATBROKER.EXE", "BASH.EXE", "BITSADMIN.EXE", "CERTOC.EXE", "CERTREQ.EXE", "CERTUTIL.EXE", "CMD.EXE", "CMDKEY.EXE", "CMDL32.EXE", "CMSTP.EXE", "CONFIGSECURITYPOLICY.EXE", "CONHOST.EXE", "CONTROL.EXE", "CSC.EXE", "CSCRIPT.EXE", "DATASVCUTIL.EXE", "DESKTOPIMGDOWNLDR.EXE", "DFSVC.EXE", "DIANTZ.EXE", "DISKSHADOW.EXE", "DNSCMD.EXE", "ESENTUTL.EXE", "EVENTVWR.EXE", "EXPAND.EXE", "EXPLORER.EXE", "EXTEXPORT.EXE", "EXTRAC32.EXE", "FINDSTR.EXE", "FINGER.EXE", "FLTMC.EXE", "FORFILES.EXE", "FTP.EXE", "GFXDOWNLOADWRAPPER.EXE", "GPSCRIPT.EXE", "HH.EXE", "IMEWDBLD.EXE", "IE4UINIT.EXE", "IEEXEC.EXE", "ILASM.EXE", "INFDEFAULTINSTALL.EXE", "INSTALLUTIL.EXE", "JSC.EXE", "MAKECAB.EXE", "MAVINJECT.EXE", "MICROSOFT.WORKFLOW.COMPILER.EXE", "MMC.EXE", "MPCMDRUN.EXE", "MSBUILD.EXE", "MSCONFIG.EXE", "MSDT.EXE", "MSHTA.EXE", "MSIEXEC.EXE", "NETSH.EXE", "ODBCCONF.EXE", "OFFLINESCANNERSHELL.EXE", "ONEDRIVESTANDALONEUPDATER.EXE", "PCALUA.EXE", "PCWRUN.EXE", "PKTMON.EXE", "PNPUTIL.EXE", "PRESENTATIONHOST.EXE", "PRINT.EXE", "PRINTBRM.EXE", "PSR.EXE", "RASAUTOU.EXE", "RDRLEAKDIAG.EXE", "REG.EXE", "REGASM.EXE", "REGEDIT.EXE", "REGINI.EXE", "REGISTER-CIMPROVIDER.EXE", "REGSVCS.EXE", "REGSVR32.EXE", "REPLACE.EXE", "RPCPING.EXE", "RUNDLL32.EXE", "RUNONCE.EXE", "RUNSCRIPTHELPER.EXE", "SC.EXE", "SCHTASKS.EXE", "SCRIPTRUNNER.EXE", "SETTINGSYNCHOST.EXE", "STORDIAG.EXE", "SYNCAPPVPUBLISHINGSERVER.EXE", "TTDINJECT.EXE", "TTTRACER.EXE", "VBC.EXE", "VERCLSID.EXE", "WAB.EXE", "WLRMDR.EXE", "WMIC.EXE", "WORKFOLDERS.EXE", "WSCRIPT.EXE", "WSRESET.EXE", "WUAUCLT.EXE", "XWIZARD.EXE", "ACCCHECKCONSOLE.EXE", "ADPLUS.EXE", "AGENTEXECUTOR.EXE", "APPVLP.EXE", "BGINFO.EXE", "CDB.EXE", "COREGEN.EXE", "CSI.EXE", "DEVTOOLSLAUNCHER.EXE", "DNX.EXE", "DOTNET.EXE", "DUMP64.EXE", "DXCAP.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "FSI.EXE", "FSIANYCPU.EXE", "MFTRACE.EXE", "MSDEPLOY.EXE", "MSXSL.EXE", "NTDSUTIL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "PROCDUMP(64).EXE", "RCSI.EXE", "REMOTE.EXE", "SQLDUMPER.EXE", "SQLPS.EXE", "SQLTOOLSPS.EXE", "SQUIRREL.EXE", "TE.EXE", "TRACKER.EXE", "UPDATE.EXE", "VSIISEXELAUNCHER.EXE", "VISUALUIAVERIFYNATIVE.EXE", "VSJITDEBUGGER.EXE", "WFC.EXE", "WINWORD.EXE", "WSL.EXE" foreach($lolbin in ($lolbins)){ $exe = Split-Path -path $executable -Leaf if ($exe.ToUpper() -eq ($lolbin)) { return $true } } return $false } function Get-IfBuiltinBinary { param( [String] $executable ) try { $authenticode = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $executable if($authenticode.IsOsBinary) { return $true } else { return $false } } catch { return $false } } function Find-CertificateInfo { param( [String] $executable ) try { $authenticode = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $executable $formattedString = [string]::Format("Status = {0}, Subject = {1}",$authenticode.Status, $authenticode.SignerCertificate.Subject) return $formattedString } catch { return "Unknown error occurred" } } function Get-ExecutableFromCommandLine { param( [String] $pathName ) $pathName = $pathName -Replace '"' $match = [regex]::Match($pathName, '[A-Za-z0-9\s]+\.(exe|dll|ocx|cmd|bat|ps1)') if($match.Success) { # Grab Index from the [regex]::Match() result $Index = $Match.Index # Substring using the index we obtained above $ThingsBeforeMatch = $pathName.Substring(0, $Index) $path = "$ThingsBeforeMatch$match" } else { Write-Host $pathName $path = $null } if((Test-Path -Path $path -PathType leaf) -eq $false) { $path = (Get-Command $path).Source } return $path } function Get-IfSafeExecutable { param( [String] $executable ) $exePath = Get-ExecutableFromCommandLine $executable if((Get-IfBuiltinBinary $exePath) -and -not (Get-IfLolBin $exePath) ) { return $true } else { return $false } } function Get-IfSafeLibrary { param( [String] $dllFullPath ) if((Get-IfBuiltinBinary $dllFullPath) -eq $true) { return $true } else { return $false } } function Get-RunAndRunOnce { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting Run properties..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $runProps = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" if($runProps) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found properties under $(Convert-Path -Path $hive)'s Run key which deserve investigation!" foreach ($prop in (Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -InputObject $runProps)) { if($psProperties.Contains($prop.Name)) { continue } # skip the property if it's powershell built-in property $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $runProps.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $prop.Name $currentHive = Convert-Path -Path $hive if(($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-18') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-19') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-20')) { $access = 'System' } else { $access = 'User' } #$exePath = Get-ExecutableFromPath($runProps.($prop.Name)) if(Get-IfSafeExecutable $runProps.($prop.Name)) { continue } $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Registry Run Key' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001' -Path $propPath -Value $runProps.($prop.Name) -AccessGained $access -Note 'Executables in properties of the key (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run are run when the user logs in.' -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting RunOnce properties..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $runOnceProps = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce" if($runOnceProps) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found properties under $(Convert-Path -Path $hive)'s RunOnce key which deserve investigation!" foreach ($prop in (Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -InputObject $runOnceProps)) { if($psProperties.Contains($prop.Name)) { continue } # skip the property if it's powershell built-in property $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $runOnceProps.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $prop.Name $currentHive = Convert-Path -Path $hive if(($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-18') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-19') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-20')) { $access = 'System' } else { $access = 'User' } if(Get-IfSafeExecutable $runOnceProps.($prop.Name)) { continue } $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Registry RunOnce Key' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001' -Path $propPath -Value $runOnceProps.($prop.Name) -AccessGained $access -Note 'Executables in properties of the key (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce are run once when the user logs in and then deleted.' -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-ImageFileExecutionOptions { $IFEOptsDebuggers = New-Object -TypeName System.Collections.ArrayList $foundDangerousIFEOpts = $false Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting Image File Execution Options..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $ifeOpts = Get-ChildItem -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options" if($ifeOpts) { foreach($key in $ifeOpts) { $debugger = Get-ItemProperty -Path Registry::$key -Name Debugger if($debugger) { $foundDangerousIFEOpts = $true $null = $IFEOptsDebuggers.Add($key) } } if($foundDangerousIFEOpts) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found subkeys under the Image File Execution Options key of $(Convert-Path -Path $hive) which deserve investigation!" foreach($key in $IFEOptsDebuggers) { $ifeProps = Get-ItemProperty -Path Registry::$key -Name Debugger foreach ($prop in (Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -InputObject $ifeProps)) { if($psProperties.Contains($prop.Name)) { continue } # skip the property if it's powershell built-in property $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $ifeProps.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $prop.Name if(Get-IfSafeExecutable $ifeProps.($prop.Name)) { continue } $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Image File Execution Options' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1546.012' -Path $propPath -Value $ifeProps.($prop.Name) -AccessGained 'System/User' -Note 'Executables in the Debugger property of a subkey of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\ are run instead of the program corresponding to the subkey. Gained access depends on whose context the debugged process runs in.' -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-NLDPDllOverridePath { $KeysWithDllOverridePath = New-Object -TypeName System.Collections.ArrayList $foundDllOverridePath = $false Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting Natural Language Development Platform DLL path override properties..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $NLDPLanguages = Get-ChildItem -Path "$hive\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ContentIndex\Language" if($NLDPLanguages) { foreach($key in $NLDPLanguages) { $DllOverridePath = Get-ItemProperty -Path Registry::$key -Name *DLLPathOverride if($DllOverridePath) { $foundDllOverridePath = $true $null = $KeysWithDllOverridePath.Add($key) } } if($foundDllOverridePath) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found subkeys under $(Convert-Path -Path $hive)\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ContentIndex\Language which deserve investigation!" foreach($key in $KeysWithDllOverridePath) { $properties = Get-ItemProperty -Path Registry::$key | Select-Object -Property *DLLPathOverride, PS* foreach ($prop in (Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -InputObject $properties)) { if($psProperties.Contains($prop.Name)) { continue } # skip the property if it's powershell built-in property $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $properties.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $prop.Name $currentHive = Convert-Path -Path $hive if(($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-18') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-19') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-20')) { $access = 'System' } else { $access = 'User' } if(Get-IfSafeLibrary $properties.($prop.Name)) { continue } $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Natural Language Development Platform 6 DLL Override Path' -Classification 'Hexacorn Technique N.98' -Path $propPath -Value $properties.($prop.Name) -AccessGained $access -Note 'DLLs listed in properties of subkeys of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ContentIndex\Language are loaded via LoadLibrary executed by SearchIndexer.exe' -Reference 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/12/30/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-98/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-AeDebug { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting AeDebug properties..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $aeDebugger = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AeDebug" -Name Debugger if($aeDebugger) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found properties under the $(Convert-Path -Path $hive) AeDebug key which deserve investigation!" foreach ($prop in (Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -InputObject $aeDebugger)) { if($psProperties.Contains($prop.Name)) { continue } # skip the property if it's powershell built-in property $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $aeDebugger.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $prop.Name if(Get-IfSafeExecutable $aeDebugger.($prop.Name)) { continue } $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'AEDebug Custom Debugger' -Classification 'Hexacorn Technique N.4' -Path $propPath -Value $aeDebugger.($prop.Name) -AccessGained 'System/User' -Note "The executable in the Debugger property of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AeDebug is run when a process crashes. Gained access depends on whose context the debugged process runs in; if the Auto property of the same registry key is set to 1, the debugger starts without user interaction. A value of 'C:\Windows\system32\vsjitdebugger.exe' might be a false positive if you have Visual Studio Community installed." -Reference 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/09/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-4/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } $aeDebugger = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AeDebug" -Name Debugger if($aeDebugger) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found properties under the $(Convert-Path -Path $hive) Wow6432Node AeDebug key which deserve investigation!" foreach ($prop in (Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -InputObject $aeDebugger)) { if($psProperties.Contains($prop.Name)) { continue } # skip the property if it's powershell built-in property $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $aeDebugger.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $prop.Name if(Get-IfSafeExecutable $aeDebugger.($prop.Name)) { continue } $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Wow6432Node AEDebug Custom Debugger' -Classification 'Hexacorn Technique N.4' -Path $propPath -Value $aeDebugger.($prop.Name) -AccessGained 'System/User' -Note "The executable in the Debugger property of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AeDebug is run when a 32 bit process on a 64 bit system crashes. Gained access depends on whose context the debugged process runs in; if the Auto property of the same registry key is set to 1, the debugger starts without user interaction. A value of 'C:\Windows\system32\vsjitdebugger.exe' might be a false positive if you have Visual Studio Community installed." -Reference 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/09/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-4/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-WerFaultHangs { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting WerFault Hangs registry key Debug property..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $werfaultDebugger = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Hangs" -Name Debugger if($werfaultDebugger) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found a Debugger property under the $(Convert-Path -Path $hive) WerFault Hangs key which deserve investigation!" $werfaultDebugger | Select-Object -Property Debugger, PS* foreach ($prop in (Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -InputObject $werfaultDebugger)) { if($psProperties.Contains($prop.Name)) { continue } # skip the property if it's powershell built-in property $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $werfaultDebugger.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $prop.Name if(Get-IfSafeExecutable $werfaultDebugger.($prop.Name)) { continue } $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Windows Error Reporting Debugger' -Classification 'Hexacorn Technique N.116' -Path $propPath -Value $werfaultDebugger.($prop.Name) -AccessGained 'System' -Note 'The executable in the Debugger property of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Hangs is spawned by WerFault.exe when a process crashes.' -Reference 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/09/20/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-116/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting WerFault Hangs registry key ReflectDebug property..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $werfaultReflectDebugger = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Hangs" -Name ReflectDebugger if($werfaultReflectDebugger) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found a ReflectDebugger property under the $(Convert-Path -Path $hive) WerFault Hangs key which deserve investigation!" $werfaultReflectDebugger | Select-Object -Property ReflectDebugger, PS* foreach ($prop in (Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -InputObject $werfaultReflectDebugger)) { if($psProperties.Contains($prop.Name)) { continue } # skip the property if it's powershell built-in property $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $werfaultReflectDebugger.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $prop.Name if(Get-IfSafeExecutable $werfaultReflectDebugger.($prop.Name)) { continue } $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Windows Error Reporting ReflectDebugger' -Classification 'Hexacorn Technique N.85' -Path $propPath -Value $werfaultReflectDebugger.($prop.Name) -AccessGained 'System' -Note 'The executable in the ReflectDebugger property of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Hangs is spawned by WerFault.exe when called with the -pr argument.' -Reference 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/08/31/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-85/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-CmdAutoRun { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting Command Processor's AutoRun property..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $autorun = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor" -Name AutoRun if($autorun) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] $(Convert-Path -Path $hive) Command Processor's AutoRun property is set and deserves investigation!" foreach ($prop in (Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -InputObject $autorun)) { if($psProperties.Contains($prop.Name)) { continue } # skip the property if it's powershell built-in property $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $autorun.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $prop.Name $currentHive = Convert-Path -Path $hive if(($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-18') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-19') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-20')) { $access = 'System' } else { $access = 'User' } if(Get-IfSafeExecutable $autorun.($prop.Name)) { continue } $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Command Processor AutoRun key' -Classification 'Uncatalogued Technique N.1' -Path $propPath -Value $autorun.($prop.Name) -AccessGained $access -Note 'The executable in the AutoRun property of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor\AutoRun is run when cmd.exe is spawned without the /D argument.' -Reference 'https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/cmdautorun.html' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-ExplorerLoad { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting Explorer's Load property..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $loadKey = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" -Name Load if($loadKey) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] $(Convert-Path -Path $hive) Load property is set and deserves investigation!" foreach ($prop in (Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -InputObject $loadKey)) { if($psProperties.Contains($prop.Name)) { continue } # skip the property if it's powershell built-in property $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $loadKey.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $prop.Name $currentHive = Convert-Path -Path $hive if(($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-18') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-19') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-20')) { $access = 'System' } else { $access = 'User' } if(Get-IfSafeExecutable $loadKey.($prop.Name)) { continue } $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Explorer Load Property' -Classification 'Uncatalogued Technique N.2' -Path $propPath -Value $loadKey.($prop.Name) -AccessGained $access -Note 'The executable in the Load property of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows is run by explorer.exe at login time.' -Reference 'https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/windowsload.html' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-WinlogonUserinit { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting Winlogon's Userinit property..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $userinit = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name Userinit if($userinit) { if($userinit.Userinit -ne 'C:\Windows\system32\userinit.exe,') { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] $(Convert-Path -Path $hive) Winlogon's Userinit property is set to a non-standard value and deserves investigation!" foreach ($prop in (Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -InputObject $userinit)) { if($psProperties.Contains($prop.Name)) { continue } # skip the property if it's powershell built-in property $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $userinit.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $prop.Name $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Winlogon Userinit Property' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1547.004' -Path $propPath -Value $userinit.($prop.Name) -AccessGained 'System' -Note "The executables in the Userinit property of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon are run at login time by any user. Normally this property should be set to 'C:\Windows\system32\userinit.exe,' without any further executables appended." -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-WinlogonShell { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting Winlogon's Shell property..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $shell = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name Shell if($shell) { if($shell.Shell -ne 'explorer.exe') { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] $(Convert-Path -Path $hive) Winlogon's Shell property is set to a non-standard value and deserves investigation!" foreach ($prop in (Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -InputObject $shell)) { if($psProperties.Contains($prop.Name)) { continue } # skip the property if it's a powershell built-in property $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $shell.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $prop.Name $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Winlogon Shell Property' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1547.004' -Path $propPath -Value $shell.($prop.Name) -AccessGained 'User' -Note "The executables in the Shell property of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon are run as the default shells for any users. Normally this property should be set to 'explorer.exe' without any further executables appended." -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-TerminalProfileStartOnUserLogin { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Checking if users' Windows Terminal Profile's settings.json contains a startOnUserLogin value..." $userDirectories = Get-ChildItem -Path 'C:\Users\' foreach($directory in $userDirectories) { $terminalDirectories = Get-ChildItem -Path "$($directory.FullName)\Appdata\Local\Packages\Microsoft.WindowsTerminal_*" foreach($terminalDirectory in $terminalDirectories) { $settingsFile = Get-Content -Raw -Path "$($terminalDirectory.FullName)\LocalState\settings.json" | ConvertFrom-Json if($settingsFile.startOnUserLogin -ne 'true') # skip to the next profile if startOnUserLogin is not present { break } $defaultProfileGuid = $settingsFile.defaultProfile $found = $false foreach($profileList in $settingsFile.profiles) { foreach($profile in $profileList.list) { if($profile.guid -eq $defaultProfileGuid) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] The file $($terminalDirectory.FullName)\LocalState\settings.json has the startOnUserLogin key set, the default profile has GUID $($profile.guid)!" if($profile.commandline) { $executable = $profile.commandline } else { $executable = $profile.name } $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Windows Terminal startOnUserLogin' -Classification 'Uncatalogued Technique N.3' -Path "$($terminalDirectory.FullName)\LocalState\settings.json" -Value "$executable" -AccessGained 'User' -Note "The executable specified as value of the key `"commandline`" of a profile which has the `"startOnUserLogin`" key set to `"true`" in the Windows Terminal's settings.json of a user is run every time that user logs in." -Reference 'https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1550836225652686848' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject $found = $true break } } if ($found) { break } } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-AppCertDlls { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting AppCertDlls properties..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $appCertDllsProps = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCertDlls" if($appCertDllsProps) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found properties under $(Convert-Path -Path $hive) AppCertDlls key which deserve investigation!" foreach ($prop in (Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -InputObject $appCertDllsProps)) { if($psProperties.Contains($prop.Name)) { continue } # skip the property if it's powershell built-in property $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $appCertDllsProps.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $prop.Name $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'AppCertDlls' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1546.009' -Path $propPath -Value $appCertDllsProps.($prop.Name) -AccessGained 'System' -Note 'DLLs in properties of the key (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCertDlls are loaded by every process that loads the Win32 API at process creation.' -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-AppPaths { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting App Paths inside the registry..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $appPathsKeys = Get-ChildItem -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths" foreach($key in $appPathsKeys) { $appPath = Get-ItemProperty -Path Registry::$key -Name '(Default)' $exePath = $appPath.'(Default)' if((Test-Path -Path $exePath -PathType leaf) -eq $false) { $exePath = "C:\Windows\System32\$exePath" } if ((Test-Path -Path $exePath -PathType leaf) -and ($exePath.Contains('powershell') -or $exePath.Contains('cmd') -or -not (Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $exePath ).IsOSBinary)) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found subkeys under the $(Convert-Path -Path $hive) App Paths key which deserve investigation!" $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $key.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $appPath.Name if(Get-IfSafeExecutable $appPath.'(Default)') { continue } $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'App Paths' -Classification 'Hexacorn Technique N.3' -Path "$propPath(Default)" -Value $appPath.'(Default)' -AccessGained 'System/User' -Note 'Executables in the (Default) property of a subkey of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\ are run instead of the program corresponding to the subkey. Gained access depends on whose context the process runs in. Be aware this might be a false positive.' -Reference 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-3/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-ServiceDlls { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting Service DLLs inside the registry..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $keys = Get-ChildItem -Path "$hive\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\" foreach ($key in $keys) { $ImagePath = (Get-ItemProperty -Path ($key.pspath)).ImagePath if ($null -ne $ImagePath) { if ($ImagePath.Contains('\svchost.exe')) { if (Test-Path -Path ($key.pspath+'\Parameters')) { $ServiceDll = (Get-ItemProperty -Path ($key.pspath+'\Parameters')).ServiceDll } else { $ServiceDll = (Get-ItemProperty -Path ($key.pspath)).ServiceDll } if ($null -ne $ServiceDll) { $dllPath = $ServiceDll if((Test-Path -Path $dllPath -PathType leaf) -eq $false) { $dllPath = "C:\Windows\System32\$dllPath" } if ((Get-IfSafeLibrary $dllPath) -EQ $false) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found subkeys under the $(Convert-Path -Path $hive) Services key which deserve investigation!" $propPath = (Convert-Path -Path "$($key.pspath)") + '\Parameters\ServiceDll' $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'ServiceDll Hijacking' -Classification 'Hexacorn Technique N.4' -Path $propPath -Value "$ServiceDll" -AccessGained 'System' -Note "DLLs in the ServiceDll property of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<SERVICE_NAME>\Parameters are loaded by the corresponding service's svchost.exe. If an attacker modifies said entry, the malicious DLL will be loaded in place of the legitimate one." -Reference 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/09/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-4/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-GPExtensionDlls { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting Group Policy Extension DLLs inside the registry..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $keys = Get-ChildItem -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\GPExtensions" foreach ($key in $keys) { $DllName = (Get-ItemProperty -Path ($key.pspath)).DllName if ($null -ne $DllName) { if((Test-Path -Path $DllName -PathType leaf) -eq $false) { $DllName = "C:\Windows\System32\$DllName" } if ((Get-IfSafeLibrary $DllName) -EQ $false) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found DllName property under a subkey of the $(Convert-Path -Path $hive) GPExtensions key which deserve investigation!" $propPath = (Convert-Path -Path "$($key.pspath)") + '\DllName' $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Group Policy Extension DLL' -Classification 'Uncatalogued Technique N.4' -Path $propPath -Value "$DllName" -AccessGained 'System' -Note 'DLLs in the DllName property of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\GPExtensions\<GUID>\ are loaded by the gpsvc process. If an attacker modifies said entry, the malicious DLL will be loaded in place of the legitimate one.' -Reference 'https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/gpoextension.html' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-WinlogonMPNotify { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting Winlogon MPNotify property..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $mpnotify = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name mpnotify if($mpnotify) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found MPnotify property under $(Convert-Path -Path $hive) Winlogon key!" $propPath = (Convert-Path -Path $mpnotify.PSPath) + '\mpnotify' $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Winlogon MPNotify Executable' -Classification 'Uncatalogued Technique N.5' -Path $propPath -Value $mpnotify.mpnotify -AccessGained 'System' -Note 'The executable specified in the "mpnotify" property of the (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon key is run by Winlogon when a user logs on. After the timeout (30s) the process and its child processes are terminated.' -Reference 'https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/mpnotify.html' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-CHMHelperDll { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting CHM Helper DLL inside the registry..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $dllLocation = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\Software\Microsoft\HtmlHelp Author" -Name Location if($dllLocation) { $dllPath = $dllLocation.Location if ($null -ne $dllPath) { if((Test-Path -Path $dllPath -PathType leaf) -eq $false) { $dllPath = "C:\Windows\System32\$dllPath" } if ((Get-IfSafeLibrary $dllPath) -EQ $false) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found Location property under $(Convert-Path -Path $hive)\Software\Microsoft\HtmlHelp Author\ which deserve investigation!" $propPath = (Convert-Path -Path "$($dllLocation.pspath)") + '\Location' $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'CHM Helper DLL' -Classification 'Hexacorn Technique N.76' -Path $propPath -Value "$($dllLocation.Location)" -AccessGained 'User' -Note 'DLLs in the Location property of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\Software\Microsoft\HtmlHelp Author\ are loaded when a CHM help file is parsed. If an attacker adds said entry, the malicious DLL will be loaded.' -Reference 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/22/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-76/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-HHCtrlHijacking { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting the hhctrl.ocx library inside the registry..." $hive = (Get-Item Registry::HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT).PSpath $dllLocation = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\CLSID\{52A2AAAE-085D-4187-97EA-8C30DB990436}\InprocServer32" -Name '(Default)' $dllPath = $dllLocation.'(Default)' if ($null -ne $dllPath) { if((Test-Path -Path $dllPath -PathType leaf) -eq $false) { $dllPath = "C:\Windows\System32\$dllPath" } if ((Test-Path -Path $dllPath -PathType leaf) -and -not (Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $dllPath ).IsOSBinary) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] The DLL at $(Convert-Path -Path $hive)\CLSID\{52A2AAAE-085D-4187-97EA-8C30DB990436}\InprocServer32\(Default) is not an OS binary and deserves investigation!" $propPath = (Convert-Path -Path "$($dllLocation.pspath)") + '\(Default)' $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Hijacking of hhctrl.ocx' -Classification 'Hexacorn Technique N.77' -Path $propPath -Value "$($dllLocation.'(Default)')" -AccessGained 'User' -Note 'The DLL in the (Default) property of HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{52A2AAAE-085D-4187-97EA-8C30DB990436}\InprocServer32 is loaded when a CHM help file is parsed or when hh.exe is started. If an attacker modifies said entry, the malicious DLL will be loaded. In case the loading fails for any reason, C:\Windows\hhctrl.ocx is loaded.' -Reference 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/23/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-77/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } else { $dllPath = "C:\Windows\System32\hhctrl.ocx" if ((Test-Path -Path $dllPath -PathType Leaf) -and -not (Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $dllPath ).IsOSBinary) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] The DLL at $dllPath is not an OS binary and deserves investigation!" $propPath = (Convert-Path -Path "$($dllLocation.pspath)") + '\(Default)' $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname "$hostname" -Technique 'Hijacking of hhctrl.ocx' -Classification 'Hexacorn Technique N.77' -Path "$dllPath" -Value "Not an OS binary" -AccessGained 'User' -Note 'The DLL in the (Default) property of HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{52A2AAAE-085D-4187-97EA-8C30DB990436}\InprocServer32 is loaded when a CHM help file is parsed or when hh.exe is started. If an attacker modifies said entry, the malicious DLL will be loaded. In case the loading fails for any reason, C:\Windows\hhctrl.ocx is loaded.' -Reference 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/23/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-77/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-StartupPrograms { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Checking if users' Startup folder contains interesting artifacts..." $userDirectories = Get-ChildItem -Path 'C:\Users\' foreach($directory in $userDirectories) { $startupDirectory = Get-ChildItem -Path "$($directory.FullName)\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\" foreach($file in $startupDirectory) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found a file under $($directory.FullName)\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ folder!" if(Get-IfSafeExecutable "$($directory.FullName)\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\$file") { continue } $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Startup Folder' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001' -Path "$($directory.FullName)\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\" -Value "$file" -AccessGained 'User' -Note "The executables under the \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ of a user's folder are run every time that user logs in." -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject $found = $true break } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-UserInitMprScript { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting users' UserInitMprLogonScript property..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $mprlogonscript = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\Environment" -Name UserInitMprLogonScript if($mprlogonscript) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found UserInitMprLogonScript property under $(Convert-Path -Path $hive)\Environment\ key!" $propPath = (Convert-Path -Path $mprlogonscript.PSPath) + '\UserInitMprLogonScript' $currentHive = Convert-Path -Path $hive if(($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-18') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-19') -or ($currentHive -eq 'HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-20')) { $access = 'System' } else { $access = 'User' } $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'User Init Mpr Logon Script' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1037.001' -Path $propPath -Value $mprlogonscript.UserInitMprLogonScript -AccessGained $access -Note 'The executable specified in the "UserInitMprLogonScript" property of the HKEY_USERS\<SID>\Environment key is run when the user logs on.' -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-AutodialDLL { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting the AutodialDLL property..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $autodialDll = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parameters" -Name AutodialDLL if($autodialDll) { $dllPath = $autodialDll.AutodialDLL if((Test-Path -Path $dllPath -PathType leaf) -eq $false) { $dllPath = "C:\Windows\System32\$dllPath" } if ((Get-IfSafeLibrary $dllPath) -EQ $false) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found AutodialDLL property under $(Convert-Path -Path $hive)\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parameters\ key which points to a non-OS DLL!" $propPath = (Convert-Path -Path $autodialDll.PSPath) + '\AutodialDLL' $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'AutodialDLL Winsock Injection' -Classification 'Hexacorn Technique N.24' -Path $propPath -Value $autodialDll.AutodialDLL -AccessGained 'System' -Note 'The DLL specified in the "AutodialDLL" property of the (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parameters key is loaded by the Winsock library everytime it connects to the internet.' -Reference 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2015/01/13/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-24/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-LsaExtensions { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting LSA's extensions..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $lsaExtensions = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LsaExtensionConfig\LsaSrv" -Name Extensions if($lsaExtensions) { $dlls = $lsaExtensions.Extensions -split '\s+' foreach ($dll in $dlls) { $dllPath = $dll if((Test-Path -Path $dllPath -PathType leaf) -eq $false) { $dllPath = "C:\Windows\System32\$dllPath" } if ((Get-IfSafeLibrary $dllPath) -EQ $false) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found LSA Extension DLL under the $(Convert-Path -Path $hive)\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LsaExtensionConfig\LsaSrv\Extensions property which points to a non-OS DLL!" $propPath = (Convert-Path -Path $lsaExtensions.PSPath) + '\Extensions' $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'LSA Extensions DLL' -Classification 'Uncatalogued Technique N.6' -Path $propPath -Value $dll -AccessGained 'System' -Note 'The DLLs specified in the "Extensions" property of the (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LsaExtensionConfig\LsaSrv\ key are loaded by LSASS at machine boot.' -Reference 'https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/lsaaextension.html' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-ServerLevelPluginDll { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting the ServerLevelPluginDll property..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $pluginDll = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters" -Name ServerLevelPluginDll if($pluginDll) { $dllPath = $pluginDll.ServerLevelPluginDll if((Test-Path -Path $dllPath -PathType leaf) -eq $false) { $dllPath = "C:\Windows\System32\$dllPath" } if ((Get-IfSafeLibrary $dllPath) -EQ $false) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found ServerLevelPluginDll property under $(Convert-Path -Path $hive)\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters key which points to a non-OS DLL!" $propPath = (Convert-Path -Path $pluginDll.PSPath) + '\ServerLevelPluginDll' $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'ServerLevelPluginDll DNS Server DLL Hijacking' -Classification 'Uncatalogued Technique N.7' -Path $propPath -Value $pluginDll.ServerLevelPluginDll -AccessGained 'System' -Note 'The DLL specified in the "ServerLevelPluginDll" property of the (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters key is loaded by the DNS service on systems with the "DNS Server" role enabled.' -Reference 'https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/serverlevelplugindll.html' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-LsaPasswordFilter { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting LSA's password filters..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $passwordFilters = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" -Name 'Notification Packages' if($passwordFilters) { $dlls = $passwordFilters.'Notification Packages' -split '\s+' foreach ($dll in $dlls) { $dllPath = "C:\Windows\System32\$dll.dll" if ((Get-IfSafeLibrary $dllPath) -EQ $false) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found a LSA password filter DLL under the $(Convert-Path -Path $hive)\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages property which points to a non-OS DLL!" $propPath = (Convert-Path -Path $passwordFilters.PSPath) + '\Notification Packages' $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'LSA Password Filter DLL' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1556.002' -Path $propPath -Value $dllPath -AccessGained 'System' -Note 'The DLLs specified in the "Notification Packages" property of the (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ key are loaded by LSASS at machine boot.' -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/002/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-LsaAuthenticationPackages { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting LSA's authentication packages..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $authPackages = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" -Name 'Authentication Packages' if($authPackages) { $dlls = $authPackages.'Authentication Packages' -split '\s+' foreach ($dll in $dlls) { $dllPath = "C:\Windows\System32\$dll.dll" if ((Get-IfSafeLibrary $dllPath) -EQ $false) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found a LSA authentication package DLL under the $(Convert-Path -Path $hive)\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Authentication Packages property which points to a non-OS DLL!" $propPath = (Convert-Path -Path $authPackages.PSPath) + '\Authentication Packages' $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'LSA Authentication Package DLL' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1547.002' -Path $propPath -Value $dllPath -AccessGained 'System' -Note 'The DLLs specified in the "Authentication Packages" property of the (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ key are loaded by LSASS at machine boot.' -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-LsaSecurityPackages { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting LSA's security packages..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $secPackages = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa" -Name 'Security Packages' if($secPackages) { $packageString = $secPackages.'Security Packages' -replace '"','' $dlls = $packageString -split '\s+' foreach ($dll in $dlls) { if($dll -eq "") { continue } if((Test-Path -Path $dllPath -PathType leaf) -eq $false) { $dllPath = "C:\Windows\System32\$dllPath.dll" } if ((Get-IfSafeLibrary $dllPath) -EQ $false) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found a LSA security package DLL under the $(Convert-Path -Path $hive)\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages property which points to a non-OS DLL!" $propPath = (Convert-Path -Path $secPackages.PSPath) + '\Security Packages' $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'LSA Security Package DLL' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1547.005' -Path $propPath -Value $dll -AccessGained 'System' -Note 'The DLLs specified in the "Security Packages" property of the (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ key are loaded by LSASS at machine boot.' -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-WinlogonNotificationPackages { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting Winlogon Notification packages..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $notificationPackages = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify" if($notificationPackages) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found properties under $(Convert-Path -Path $hive)\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify key which deserve investigation!" foreach ($prop in (Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -InputObject $notificationPackages)) { if($psProperties.Contains($prop.Name)) { continue } # skip the property if it's powershell built-in property $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $notificationPackages.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $prop.Name $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Winlogon Notification Package' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1547.004' -Path $propPath -Value $notificationPackages.($prop.Name) -AccessGained 'System' -Note 'DLLs in the properties of the (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify key are loaded by the system when it boots.' -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/004/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-ExplorerTools { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting Explorer Tools..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $explorerTools = Get-ChildItem -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer" foreach($key in $explorerTools) { $path = ((Get-ItemProperty -Path Registry::$key -Name '(Default)').'(Default)'-split '\s+')[0] # split the path and take only the executable in case there are arguments if((Test-Path -Path $path -PathType leaf) -eq $false) { $path = "C:\Windows\System32\$path.dll" } if ((Test-Path -Path $path -PathType leaf) -and -not (Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $path ).IsOSBinary) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found an executable under a subkey of $(Convert-Path -Path $hive)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer key which deserve investigation!" $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $key.PSPath $propPath += '\(Default)' $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Explorer Tools Hijacking' -Classification 'Hexacorn Technique N.55' -Path $propPath -Value $path -AccessGained 'System' -Note 'Executables in the (Default) property of a subkey of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer are run when the corresponding event is triggered.' -Reference 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/01/18/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-55/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-DotNetDebugger { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting .NET Debugger properties..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $dotNetDebugger = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework" -Name DbgManagedDebugger if($dotNetDebugger.DbgManagedDebugger) { if(Get-IfSafeExecutable $dotNetDebugger.DbgManagedDebugger) { continue } Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found DbgManagedDebugger under the $(Convert-Path -Path $hive)\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework key which deserve investigation!" $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $dotNetDebugger.PSPath $propPath += '\DbgManagedDebugger' $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'DbgManagedDebugger Custom Debugger' -Classification 'Hexacorn Technique N.4' -Path $propPath -Value $dotNetDebugger.DbgManagedDebugger -AccessGained 'System/User' -Note "The executable in the DbgManagedDebugger property of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\.NETFramework is run when a .NET process crashes. Gained access depends on whose context the debugged process runs in." -Reference 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/09/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-4/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } $dotNetDebugger = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\.NETFramework" -Name DbgManagedDebugger if($dotNetDebugger.DbgManagedDebugger) { if(Get-IfSafeExecutable $dotNetDebugger.DbgManagedDebugger) { continue } Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found DbgManagedDebugger under the $(Convert-Path -Path $hive)\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\.NETFramework key which deserve investigation!" $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $dotNetDebugger.PSPath $propPath += '\DbgManagedDebugger' $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Wow6432Node DbgManagedDebugger Custom Debugger' -Classification 'Hexacorn Technique N.4' -Path $propPath -Value $dotNetDebugger.DbgManagedDebugger -AccessGained 'System/User' -Note "The executable in the DbgManagedDebugger property of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\.NETFramework is run when a .NET 32 bit process on a 64 bit system crashes. Gained access depends on whose context the debugged process runs in." -Reference 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/09/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-4/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-ErrorHandlerCmd { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Checking if C:\WINDOWS\Setup\Scripts\ contains a file called ErrorHandler.cmd..." $errorHandlerCmd = Get-ChildItem -Path 'C:\WINDOWS\Setup\Scripts\ErrorHandler.cmd' if($errorHandlerCmd) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found C:\WINDOWS\Setup\Scripts\ErrorHandler.cmd!" $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'ErrorHandler.cmd Hijacking' -Classification 'Hexacorn Technique N.135' -Path "C:\WINDOWS\Setup\Scripts\" -Value "ErrorHandler.cmd" -AccessGained 'User' -Note "The content of C:\WINDOWS\Setup\Scripts\ErrorHandler.cmd is read whenever some tools under C:\WINDOWS\System32\oobe\ (e.g. Setup.exe) fail to run for any reason." -Reference 'https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2022/01/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-135/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-WMIEventsSubscrition { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Checking WMI Subscriptions..." $cmdEventConsumer = Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class CommandLineEventConsumer if ($cmdEventConsumer) { foreach ( $cmdEntry in ($cmdEventConsumer)) { $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'WMI Event Subscription' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1546.003' -Path $cmdEntry.__PATH -Value "CommandLineTemplate: $($cmdEntry.CommandLineTemplate) / ExecutablePath: $($cmdEntry.ExecutablePath)" -AccessGained 'System' -Note "WMI Events subscriptions can be used to link script/command executions to specific events. Here we list the active consumer events, but you may want to review also existing Filters (with Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __EventFilter) and Bindings (with Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding)" -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } $scriptEventConsumer = Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class ActiveScriptEventConsumer if ($scriptEventConsumer) { foreach ( $scriptEntry in ($scriptEventConsumer)) { $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'WMI Event Subscription' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1546.003' -Path $scriptEntry.__PATH -Value "ScriptingEngine: $($scriptEntry.ScriptingEngine) / ScriptFileName: $($scriptEntry.ScriptFileName) / ScriptText: $($scriptEntry.ScriptText)" -AccessGained 'System' -Note "WMI Events subscriptions can be used to link script/command executions to specific events. Here we list the active consumer events, but you may want to review also existing Filters (with Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __EventFilter) and Bindings (with Get-WMIObject -Namespace root\Subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding)" -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-WindowsServices { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Checking Windows Services..." $services = Get-CimInstance -ClassName win32_service | Select-Object Name,DisplayName,State,PathName foreach ( $service in $services) { $path = Get-ExecutableFromCommandLine $service.PathName if ((Get-IfSafeExecutable $path) -EQ $false) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found Windows Services which may deserve investigation..." $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Windows Service' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1543.003' -Path $service.Name -Value $service.PathName -AccessGained 'System' -Note "Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions." -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-TSInitialProgram { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Getting Terminal Services InitialProgram properties..." foreach($hive in $systemAndUsersHives) { $InitialProgram = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services" -Name InitialProgram $fInheritInitialProgram = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services" -Name fInheritInitialProgram if($null -ne $InitialProgram.InitialProgram -and $InitialProgram.InitialProgram.Length -ne 0 -and $fInheritInitialProgram -eq 1) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found InitialProgram property under the $(Convert-Path -Path $hive) Terminal Services key which deserve investigation!" foreach ($prop in (Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -InputObject $InitialProgram)) { if($psProperties.Contains($prop.Name)) { continue } # skip the property if it's powershell built-in property $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $InitialProgram.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $prop.Name if(Get-IfSafeExecutable $InitialProgram.($prop.Name)) { continue } $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Terminal Services InitialProgram' -Classification 'Uncatalogued Technique N.8' -Path $propPath -Value $InitialProgram.($prop.Name) -AccessGained 'System/User' -Note "The executable in the InitialProgram property of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services is run when a Remote Desktop Connection is made to the target machine. Gained access depends on whether the key is in the system hive or a user's hive. For this technique to work, the fInheritInitialProgram property of the same key must also be set to 1." -Reference 'https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/tsinitialprogram.html' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } $InitialProgram = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" -Name InitialProgram $fInheritInitialProgram = Get-ItemProperty -Path "$hive\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" -Name fInheritInitialProgram if($null -ne $InitialProgram.InitialProgram -and $InitialProgram.InitialProgram.Length -ne 0 -and $fInheritInitialProgram -eq 1) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found InitialProgram property under the $(Convert-Path -Path $hive) Terminal Services key which deserve investigation!" foreach ($prop in (Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty -InputObject $InitialProgram)) { if($psProperties.Contains($prop.Name)) { continue } # skip the property if it's powershell built-in property $propPath = Convert-Path -Path $InitialProgram.PSPath $propPath += '\' + $prop.Name if(Get-IfSafeExecutable $InitialProgram.($prop.Name)) { continue } $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Terminal Services InitialProgram' -Classification 'Uncatalogued Technique N.8' -Path $propPath -Value $InitialProgram.($prop.Name) -AccessGained 'System/User' -Note "The executable in the InitialProgram property of (HKLM|HKEY_USERS\<SID>)\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services is run when a Remote Desktop Connection is made to the target machine. Gained access depends on whether the key is in the system hive or a user's hive. For this technique to work, the fInheritInitialProgram property of the same key must also be set to 1." -Reference 'https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/tsinitialprogram.html' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } function Get-AccessibilityTools { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Looking for accessibility tools backdoors..." $accessibilityTools = @( "$env:windir\System32\sethc.exe", "$env:windir\System32\osk.exe", "$env:windir\System32\Narrator.exe", "$env:windir\System32\Magnify.exe", "$env:windir\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe" ) $cmdHash = Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $env:windir\System32\cmd.exe $psHash = Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $env:windir\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe $explorerHash = Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $env:windir\explorer.exe $backdoorHashes = [ordered]@{ $cmdHash.Hash = "$env:windir\System32\cmd.exe"; $psHash.Hash = "$env:windir\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"; $explorerHash.Hash = "$env:windir\explorer.exe" } foreach($tool in $accessibilityTools) { if((Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $tool).IsOSBinary -ne $true) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found a suspicious executable in place of of the accessibility tool $tool" $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Accessibility Tools Backdoor' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1546.008' -Path $tool -Value $tool -AccessGained 'System' -Note "Accessibility tools are executables that can be run from the lock screen of a Windows machine and are supposed to enable accessibility features like text to speech or zooming in on the screen. If an attacker replaces them with malicious or LOLBIN executables they can execute code with SYSTEM permission from a lock screen, effectively bypassing authentication. In this case, the accessibility tool in the Path field is not an OS executable, so it may have been replaced with a malicious, non-Microsoft executable." -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } else { $toolHash = Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $tool foreach($hash in $backdoorHashes.Keys) { if($toolHash.Hash -eq $hash) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - [!] Found a suspicious executable in place of of the accessibility tool $tool" $PersistenceObject = New-PersistenceObject -Hostname $hostname -Technique 'Accessibility Tools Backdoor' -Classification 'MITRE ATT&CK T1546.008' -Path $tool -Value $backdoorHashes[$hash] -AccessGained 'System' -Note "Accessibility tools are executables that can be run from the lock screen of a Windows machine and are supposed to enable accessibility features like text to speech or zooming in on the screen. If an attacker replaces them with malicious or LOLBIN executables they can execute code with SYSTEM permission from a lock screen, effectively bypassing authentication. In this case, the accessibility tool in the Path field has been replaced with the binary in the Value field." -Reference 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008/' $null = $persistenceObjectArray.Add($PersistenceObject) $PersistenceObject } } } } Write-Verbose -Message '' } Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Starting execution..." if($PersistenceMethod -eq 'All') { Get-RunAndRunOnce Get-ImageFileExecutionOptions Get-NLDPDllOverridePath Get-AeDebug Get-WerFaultHangs Get-CmdAutoRun Get-ExplorerLoad Get-WinlogonUserinit Get-WinlogonShell Get-TerminalProfileStartOnUserLogin Get-AppCertDlls Get-ServiceDlls Get-GPExtensionDlls Get-WinlogonMPNotify Get-CHMHelperDll Get-HHCtrlHijacking Get-StartupPrograms Get-UserInitMprScript Get-AutodialDLL Get-LsaExtensions Get-ServerLevelPluginDll Get-LsaPasswordFilter Get-LsaAuthenticationPackages Get-LsaSecurityPackages Get-WinlogonNotificationPackages Get-ExplorerTools Get-DotNetDebugger Get-ErrorHandlerCmd Get-WMIEventsSubscrition Get-TSInitialProgram Get-AccessibilityTools if($IncludeHighFalsePositivesChecks.IsPresent) { Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - You have used the -IncludeHighFalsePositivesChecks switch, this may generate a lot of false positives since it includes checks with results which are difficult to filter programmatically..." Get-AppPaths Get-WindowsServices } } else { switch($PersistenceMethod) { 'RunAndRunOnce' { Get-RunAndRunOnce break } 'ImageFileExecutionOptions' { Get-ImageFileExecutionOptions break } 'NLDPDllOverridePath' { Get-NLDPDllOverridePath break } 'AeDebug' { Get-AeDebug break } 'WerFaultHangs' { Get-WerFaultHangs break } 'CmdAutoRun' { Get-CmdAutoRun break } 'ExplorerLoad' { Get-ExplorerLoad break } 'WinlogonUserinit' { Get-WinlogonUserinit break } 'WinlogonShell' { Get-WinlogonShell break } 'TerminalProfileStartOnUserLogin' { Get-TerminalProfileStartOnUserLogin break } 'AppCertDlls' { Get-AppCertDlls break } 'ServiceDlls' { Get-ServiceDlls break } 'GPExtensionDlls' { Get-GPExtensionDlls break } 'WinlogonMPNotify' { Get-WinlogonMPNotify break } 'CHMHelperDll' { Get-CHMHelperDll break } 'HHCtrlHijacking' { Get-HHCtrlHijacking break } 'StartupPrograms' { Get-StartupPrograms break } 'UserInitMprScript' { Get-UserInitMprScript break } 'AutodialDLL' { Get-AutodialDLL break } 'LsaExtensions' { Get-LsaExtensions break } 'ServerLevelPluginDll' { Get-ServerLevelPluginDll break } 'LsaPasswordFilter' { Get-LsaPasswordFilter break } 'LsaAuthenticationPackages' { Get-LsaAuthenticationPackages break } 'LsaSecurityPackages' { Get-LsaSecurityPackages break } 'WinlogonNotificationPackages' { Get-WinlogonNotificationPackages break } 'ExplorerTools' { Get-ExplorerTools break } 'DotNetDebugger' { Get-DotNetDebugger break } 'ErrorHandlerCmd' { Get-ErrorHandlerCmd break } 'WMIEventsSubscrition' { Get-WMIEventsSubscrition break } 'WindowsServices' { Get-WindowsServices break } 'AppPaths' { Get-AppPaths break } 'TerminalServicesInitialProgram' { Get-TSInitialProgram break } 'AccessibilityTools' { Get-AccessibilityTools break } } } Write-Verbose -Message "$hostname - Execution finished." } if($ComputerName) { Invoke-Command -ComputerName $ComputerName -ScriptBlock $ScriptBlock } else { Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock $ScriptBlock } # Use Input CSV to make a diff of the results and only show us the persistences implanted on the local machine which are not in the CSV if($DiffCSV) { Write-Verbose -Message 'Diffing found persistences with the ones in the input CSV...' $importedPersistenceObjectArray = Import-Csv -Path $DiffCSV -ErrorAction Stop $newPersistenceObjectArray = New-Object -TypeName System.Collections.ArrayList foreach($localPersistence in $persistenceObjectArray) { $found = $false foreach($importedPersistence in $importedPersistenceObjectArray) { if(($importedPersistence.Technique -eq $localPersistence.Technique) -and ($importedPersistence.Path -eq $localPersistence.Path) -and ($importedPersistence.Value -eq $localPersistence.Value)) { $found = $true break } } if($found -eq $false) { $null = $newPersistenceObjectArray.Add($localPersistence) } } $persistenceObjectArray = $newPersistenceObjectArray.Clone() } if($OutputCSV) { $persistenceObjectArray | ConvertTo-Csv | Out-File -FilePath $OutputCSV -ErrorAction Stop } Write-Verbose -Message 'Script execution finished.' } # 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